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[PATCH v2 1/2] packet: Do not decrypt zero length rest of buffer
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- Subject: [PATCH v2 1/2] packet: Do not decrypt zero length rest of buffer
- From: Alan Dunn <amdunn@xxxxxxxxx>
- Reply-to: libssh@xxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2014 08:12:46 -0600
- To: libssh@xxxxxxxxxx
- Cc: Alan Dunn <amdunn@xxxxxxxxx>
If we receive a packet of length exactly blocksize, then packet_decrypt gets called on a buffer of size 0. The check at the beginning of packet_decrypt indicates that the function should be called on buffers of at least one blocksize, though the check allows through zero length. As is packet_decrypt can return -1 when len is 0 because malloc can return NULL in this case: according to the ISO C standard, malloc is free to return NULL or a pointer that can be freed when size == 0, and uclibc by default will return NULL here (in "non-glibc-compatible" mode). The net result is that when using uclibc connections with libssh can anomalously fail. Alternatively, packet_decrypt (and probably packet_encrypt for consistency) could be made to always succeed on len == 0 without depending on the behavior of malloc. Thanks to Josh Berlin for bringing conneciton failures with uclibc to my attention. Signed-off-by: Alan Dunn <amdunn@xxxxxxxxx> --- src/packet.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- src/packet1.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/packet.c b/src/packet.c index 87b9100..e57e67e 100644 --- a/src/packet.c +++ b/src/packet.c @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user) const uint8_t *packet; int to_be_read; int rc; - uint32_t len, compsize, payloadsize; + uint32_t len, compsize, payloadsize, buffer_len; uint8_t padding; size_t processed = 0; /* number of byte processed from the callback */ @@ -251,12 +251,17 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user) * Decrypt the rest of the packet (blocksize bytes already * have been decrypted) */ - rc = packet_decrypt(session, - ((uint8_t*)buffer_get_rest(session->in_buffer) + blocksize), - buffer_get_rest_len(session->in_buffer) - blocksize); - if (rc < 0) { - ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "Decrypt error"); - goto error; + + /* The following check avoids decrypting zero bytes */ + buffer_len = buffer_get_rest_len(session->in_buffer); + if (buffer_len != blocksize) { + rc = packet_decrypt(session, + ((uint8_t*)buffer_get_rest(session->in_buffer) + blocksize), + buffer_len - blocksize); + if (rc < 0) { + ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "Decrypt error"); + goto error; + } } /* copy the last part from the incoming buffer */ diff --git a/src/packet1.c b/src/packet1.c index ec72f16..3284f17 100644 --- a/src/packet1.c +++ b/src/packet1.c @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback1(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user size_t processed=0; uint32_t padding; uint32_t crc; - uint32_t len; + uint32_t len, buffer_len; ssh_session session=(ssh_session)user; switch (session->packet_state){ @@ -168,11 +168,16 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback1(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user * We decrypt everything, missing the lenght part (which was * previously read, unencrypted, and is not part of the buffer */ - if (packet_decrypt(session, - ssh_buffer_get_begin(session->in_buffer), - ssh_buffer_get_len(session->in_buffer)) < 0) { - ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "Packet decrypt error"); - goto error; + buffer_len = ssh_buffer_get_len(session->in_buffer); + if (buffer_len > 0) { + int rc; + rc = packet_decrypt(session, + ssh_buffer_get_begin(session->in_buffer), + buffer_len); + if (rc < 0) { + ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "Packet decrypt error"); + goto error; + } } } #ifdef DEBUG_CRYPTO @@ -300,6 +305,8 @@ int packet_send1(ssh_session session) { ssh_buffer_get_len(session->out_buffer)); #endif + /* session->out_buffer should have more than sizeof(uint32_t) bytes + in it as required for packet_encrypt */ packet_encrypt(session, (unsigned char *)ssh_buffer_get_begin(session->out_buffer) + sizeof(uint32_t), ssh_buffer_get_len(session->out_buffer) - sizeof(uint32_t)); -- 1.7.9.5
[PATCH v2 0/2] Fix connection success dependency on malloc behavior | Alan Dunn <amdunn@xxxxxxxxx> |