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Re: Build libssh against openssl 1.1.0
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- Subject: Re: Build libssh against openssl 1.1.0
- From: Andreas Schneider <asn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Reply-to: libssh@xxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 05 Nov 2016 17:02:13 +0100
- To: libssh@xxxxxxxxxx
- Cc: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@xxxxxxxxxx>
On Wednesday, 2 November 2016 17:58:01 CET Jakub Jelen wrote: > Andreas, > thank you for the comments. I reworked the patch (attached) to smaller > parts that finally build and passes the testsuite in master for both > OpenSSL versions (sorry for the first bad version). It also improves the > readability of some constructions according to your hints. Thank you very much. I split up one patch which didn't have your sign off. The patchset is attached. I need your ok to add your sign-off and push it. Cheers, Andreas -- Andreas Schneider GPG-ID: CC014E3D www.cryptomilk.org asn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
From e86d8d12722e299cec3145cfdf625f40697a93d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2016 16:20:46 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/6] libcrypto: Remove AES_ctr128_encrypt()
This is for OpenSSL 1.1.0.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
src/libcrypto.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/libcrypto.c b/src/libcrypto.c
index ac95010..19065bd 100644
--- a/src/libcrypto.c
+++ b/src/libcrypto.c
@@ -587,7 +587,11 @@ static void aes_ctr_encrypt(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher, void *in, void *ou
* Same for num, which is being used to store the current offset in blocksize in CTR
* function.
*/
+# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &cipher->aes_key->key, cipher->aes_key->IV, tmp_buffer, &num, (block128_f)AES_encrypt);
+# else
AES_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &cipher->aes_key->key, cipher->aes_key->IV, tmp_buffer, &num);
+# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L */
}
static void aes_ctr_cleanup(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher){
--
2.10.1
From 79a7ac204f83439c63fcaba840eec9e5b4211989 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2016 16:38:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/6] libcrypto: Introduce a libcrypto compat file
This is for OpenSSL 1.1.0 support.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
src/CMakeLists.txt | 1 +
src/libcrypto-compat.c | 335 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/libcrypto-compat.h | 42 +++++++
3 files changed, 378 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 src/libcrypto-compat.c
create mode 100644 src/libcrypto-compat.h
diff --git a/src/CMakeLists.txt b/src/CMakeLists.txt
index ab9f184..3c22dfa 100644
--- a/src/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/src/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ set(libssh_SRCS
known_hosts.c
legacy.c
libcrypto.c
+ libcrypto-compat.c
log.c
match.c
messages.c
diff --git a/src/libcrypto-compat.c b/src/libcrypto-compat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f27dd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/libcrypto-compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include "libcrypto-compat.h"
+
+static void *OPENSSL_zalloc(size_t num)
+{
+ void *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ memset(ret, 0, num);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
+{
+ /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be
+ * left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
+ */
+ if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
+ || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (n != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->n);
+ r->n = n;
+ }
+ if (e != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->e);
+ r->e = e;
+ }
+ if (d != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->d);
+ r->d = d;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
+{
+ /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+ */
+ if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+ || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->p);
+ r->p = p;
+ }
+ if (q != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->q);
+ r->q = q;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
+{
+ /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+ */
+ if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
+ || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
+ || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (dmp1 != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->dmp1);
+ r->dmp1 = dmp1;
+ }
+ if (dmq1 != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->dmq1);
+ r->dmq1 = dmq1;
+ }
+ if (iqmp != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->iqmp);
+ r->iqmp = iqmp;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
+ const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
+{
+ if (n != NULL)
+ *n = r->n;
+ if (e != NULL)
+ *e = r->e;
+ if (d != NULL)
+ *d = r->d;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
+{
+ if (p != NULL)
+ *p = r->p;
+ if (q != NULL)
+ *q = r->q;
+}
+
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
+ const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
+ const BIGNUM **iqmp)
+{
+ if (dmp1 != NULL)
+ *dmp1 = r->dmp1;
+ if (dmq1 != NULL)
+ *dmq1 = r->dmq1;
+ if (iqmp != NULL)
+ *iqmp = r->iqmp;
+}
+
+void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d,
+ const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g)
+{
+ if (p != NULL)
+ *p = d->p;
+ if (q != NULL)
+ *q = d->q;
+ if (g != NULL)
+ *g = d->g;
+}
+
+int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+ /* If the fields p, q and g in d are NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+ */
+ if ((d->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+ || (d->q == NULL && q == NULL)
+ || (d->g == NULL && g == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ BN_free(d->p);
+ d->p = p;
+ }
+ if (q != NULL) {
+ BN_free(d->q);
+ d->q = q;
+ }
+ if (g != NULL) {
+ BN_free(d->g);
+ d->g = g;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d,
+ const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
+{
+ if (pub_key != NULL)
+ *pub_key = d->pub_key;
+ if (priv_key != NULL)
+ *priv_key = d->priv_key;
+}
+
+int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+ /* If the field pub_key in d is NULL, the corresponding input
+ * parameters MUST be non-NULL. The priv_key field may
+ * be left NULL.
+ */
+ if (d->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (pub_key != NULL) {
+ BN_free(d->pub_key);
+ d->pub_key = pub_key;
+ }
+ if (priv_key != NULL) {
+ BN_free(d->priv_key);
+ d->priv_key = priv_key;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
+{
+ if (pr != NULL)
+ *pr = sig->r;
+ if (ps != NULL)
+ *ps = sig->s;
+}
+
+int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
+{
+ if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ BN_clear_free(sig->r);
+ BN_clear_free(sig->s);
+ sig->r = r;
+ sig->s = s;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
+{
+ if (pr != NULL)
+ *pr = sig->r;
+ if (ps != NULL)
+ *ps = sig->s;
+}
+
+int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
+{
+ if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ BN_clear_free(sig->r);
+ BN_clear_free(sig->s);
+ sig->r = r;
+ sig->s = s;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
+}
+
+static void OPENSSL_clear_free(void *str, size_t num)
+{
+ if (str == NULL)
+ return;
+ if (num)
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(str, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(str);
+}
+
+/* This call frees resources associated with the context */
+int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Don't assume ctx->md_data was cleaned in EVP_Digest_Final, because
+ * sometimes only copies of the context are ever finalised.
+ */
+ if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->cleanup
+ && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED))
+ ctx->digest->cleanup(ctx);
+ if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size && ctx->md_data
+ && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE)) {
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size);
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx->pctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ ENGINE_finish(ctx->engine);
+#endif
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void)
+{
+ HMAC_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
+
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ if (!HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx)) {
+ HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void hmac_ctx_cleanup(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX_reset(&ctx->i_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_reset(&ctx->o_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_reset(&ctx->md_ctx);
+ ctx->md = NULL;
+ ctx->key_length = 0;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->key, sizeof(ctx->key));
+}
+
+void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ hmac_ctx_cleanup(ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(&ctx->i_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(&ctx->o_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(&ctx->md_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ }
+}
+
+int HMAC_CTX_reset(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ HMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX));
+}
+
+void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ /* EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx); alias */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+#else
+typedef int iso_c_forbids_an_empty_source_file;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
diff --git a/src/libcrypto-compat.h b/src/libcrypto-compat.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21542c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/libcrypto-compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+#ifndef LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H
+#define LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q);
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp);
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d);
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q);
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, const BIGNUM **iqmp);
+
+void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g);
+int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+
+void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+
+void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+
+int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void);
+void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+
+HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void);
+int HMAC_CTX_reset(HMAC_CTX *ctx);
+void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx);
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+
+#endif /* LIBCRYPTO_COMPAT_H */
--
2.10.1
From 826b504d9327e50854fa07309c8e629dbc68997e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Sat, 5 Nov 2016 16:51:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] SIGN-OFF libcrypto: Use newer API ofr HMAC
This is for OpenSSL 1.1.0 support.
---
src/libcrypto.c | 17 +++++++++--------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/libcrypto.c b/src/libcrypto.c
index 19065bd..64c92ea 100644
--- a/src/libcrypto.c
+++ b/src/libcrypto.c
@@ -378,32 +378,33 @@ void ssh_mac_final(unsigned char *md, ssh_mac_ctx ctx) {
HMACCTX hmac_init(const void *key, int len, enum ssh_hmac_e type) {
HMACCTX ctx = NULL;
- ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+ ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
#ifndef OLD_CRYPTO
- HMAC_CTX_init(ctx); // openssl 0.9.7 requires it.
+ HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx); // openssl 0.9.7 requires it.
#endif
switch(type) {
case SSH_HMAC_SHA1:
- HMAC_Init(ctx, key, len, EVP_sha1());
+ HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, len, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
break;
case SSH_HMAC_SHA256:
- HMAC_Init(ctx, key, len, EVP_sha256());
+ HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, len, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
break;
case SSH_HMAC_SHA384:
- HMAC_Init(ctx, key, len, EVP_sha384());
+ HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, len, EVP_sha384(), NULL);
break;
case SSH_HMAC_SHA512:
- HMAC_Init(ctx, key, len, EVP_sha512());
+ HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, len, EVP_sha512(), NULL);
break;
case SSH_HMAC_MD5:
- HMAC_Init(ctx, key, len, EVP_md5());
+ HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, len, EVP_md5(), NULL);
break;
default:
+ HMAC_CTX_free(ctx);
SAFE_FREE(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
}
@@ -419,7 +420,7 @@ void hmac_final(HMACCTX ctx, unsigned char *hashmacbuf, unsigned int *len) {
HMAC_Final(ctx,hashmacbuf,len);
#ifndef OLD_CRYPTO
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_reset(ctx);
#else
HMAC_cleanup(ctx);
#endif
--
2.10.1
From 4abe9412b050270b16bf817023a83c9865c041b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Sat, 5 Nov 2016 16:52:41 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] SIGN-OFF libcrypto: Use a pointer for EVP_MD_CTX
This is for OpenSSL 1.1.0 support.
---
src/libcrypto.c | 11 ++++++-----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/libcrypto.c b/src/libcrypto.c
index 64c92ea..622b447 100644
--- a/src/libcrypto.c
+++ b/src/libcrypto.c
@@ -135,18 +135,19 @@ static const EVP_MD *nid_to_evpmd(int nid)
void evp(int nid, unsigned char *digest, int len, unsigned char *hash, unsigned int *hlen)
{
const EVP_MD *evp_md = nid_to_evpmd(nid);
- EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, digest, len);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&md, hash, hlen);
+ EVP_DigestInit(md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, digest, len);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(md, hash, hlen);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
}
EVPCTX evp_init(int nid)
{
const EVP_MD *evp_md = nid_to_evpmd(nid);
- EVPCTX ctx = malloc(sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
+ EVPCTX ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
--
2.10.1
From d1c6127dd435935eaa43b93ba73a6e4211c71728 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Sat, 5 Nov 2016 16:54:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 5/6] SIGN-OFF libcrypto: Use a pointer for EVP_CIPHER_CTX
This has been made opaque and it needs to be a pointer.
This is for OpenSSL 1.1.0 support.
---
include/libssh/crypto.h | 2 +-
src/libcrypto.c | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
src/wrapper.c | 11 +++++++++++
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/libssh/crypto.h b/include/libssh/crypto.h
index 102c8d7..4c79c8c 100644
--- a/include/libssh/crypto.h
+++ b/include/libssh/crypto.h
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ struct ssh_cipher_struct {
struct ssh_3des_key_schedule *des3_key;
struct ssh_aes_key_schedule *aes_key;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
#endif
unsigned int keysize; /* bytes of key used. != keylen */
/* sets the new key for immediate use */
diff --git a/src/libcrypto.c b/src/libcrypto.c
index 622b447..10956b6 100644
--- a/src/libcrypto.c
+++ b/src/libcrypto.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "libcrypto-compat.h"
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_AES_H
#define HAS_AES
@@ -430,6 +431,10 @@ void hmac_final(HMACCTX ctx, unsigned char *hashmacbuf, unsigned int *len) {
}
static void evp_cipher_init(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher) {
+ if (cipher->ctx == NULL) {
+ cipher->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ }
+
switch(cipher->ciphertype){
case SSH_AES128_CBC:
cipher->cipher = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
@@ -480,14 +485,14 @@ static int evp_cipher_set_encrypt_key(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher,
int rc;
evp_cipher_init(cipher);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cipher->ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(cipher->ctx);
- rc = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&cipher->ctx, cipher->cipher, NULL, key, IV);
+ rc = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(cipher->ctx, cipher->cipher, NULL, key, IV);
if (rc != 1){
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARNING, "EVP_EncryptInit_ex failed");
return SSH_ERROR;
}
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&cipher->ctx, 0);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(cipher->ctx, 0);
return SSH_OK;
}
@@ -497,14 +502,14 @@ static int evp_cipher_set_decrypt_key(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher,
int rc;
evp_cipher_init(cipher);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cipher->ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(cipher->ctx);
- rc = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&cipher->ctx, cipher->cipher, NULL, key, IV);
+ rc = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(cipher->ctx, cipher->cipher, NULL, key, IV);
if (rc != 1){
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARNING, "EVP_DecryptInit_ex failed");
return SSH_ERROR;
}
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&cipher->ctx, 0);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(cipher->ctx, 0);
return SSH_OK;
}
@@ -517,7 +522,7 @@ static void evp_cipher_encrypt(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher,
int outlen = 0;
int rc = 0;
- rc = EVP_EncryptUpdate(&cipher->ctx, (unsigned char *)out, &outlen, (unsigned char *)in, len);
+ rc = EVP_EncryptUpdate(cipher->ctx, (unsigned char *)out, &outlen, (unsigned char *)in, len);
if (rc != 1){
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARNING, "EVP_EncryptUpdate failed");
return;
@@ -535,7 +540,7 @@ static void evp_cipher_decrypt(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher,
int outlen = 0;
int rc = 0;
- rc = EVP_DecryptUpdate(&cipher->ctx, (unsigned char *)out, &outlen, (unsigned char *)in, len);
+ rc = EVP_DecryptUpdate(cipher->ctx, (unsigned char *)out, &outlen, (unsigned char *)in, len);
if (rc != 1){
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_WARNING, "EVP_DecryptUpdate failed");
return;
@@ -547,7 +552,7 @@ static void evp_cipher_decrypt(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher,
}
static void evp_cipher_cleanup(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cipher->ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(cipher->ctx);
}
#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_AES_CTR
diff --git a/src/wrapper.c b/src/wrapper.c
index a7511f0..eaad255 100644
--- a/src/wrapper.c
+++ b/src/wrapper.c
@@ -100,6 +100,14 @@ static struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher_new(int offset) {
/* note the memcpy will copy the pointers : so, you shouldn't free them */
memcpy(cipher, &ssh_get_ciphertab()[offset], sizeof(*cipher));
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO
+ cipher->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (cipher->ctx == NULL) {
+ free(cipher);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
return cipher;
}
@@ -123,6 +131,9 @@ void ssh_cipher_clear(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher){
if (cipher->cleanup != NULL){
cipher->cleanup(cipher);
}
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cipher->ctx);
+#endif
}
static void cipher_free(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher) {
--
2.10.1
From 80ff20672d293bda08ab23cda94891ad59aba598 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2016 17:02:58 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] pki_crypto: Use getters and setters for opaque keys and
signatures
This is for OpenSSL 1.1.0 support.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
src/pki_crypto.c | 295 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 203 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/pki_crypto.c b/src/pki_crypto.c
index dabf54b..70ac685 100644
--- a/src/pki_crypto.c
+++ b/src/pki_crypto.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include "libcrypto-compat.h"
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EC_H
#include <openssl/ec.h>
@@ -230,7 +231,10 @@ ssh_key pki_key_dup(const ssh_key key, int demote)
}
switch (key->type) {
- case SSH_KEYTYPE_DSS:
+ case SSH_KEYTYPE_DSS: {
+ const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL,
+ *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *np, *nq, *ng, *npub_key, *npriv_key;
new->dsa = DSA_new();
if (new->dsa == NULL) {
goto fail;
@@ -243,36 +247,54 @@ ssh_key pki_key_dup(const ssh_key key, int demote)
* pub_key = public key y = g^x
* priv_key = private key x
*/
- new->dsa->p = BN_dup(key->dsa->p);
- if (new->dsa->p == NULL) {
+ DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+ np = BN_dup(p);
+ nq = BN_dup(q);
+ ng = BN_dup(g);
+ if (np == NULL || nq == NULL || ng == NULL) {
+ BN_free(np);
+ BN_free(nq);
+ BN_free(ng);
goto fail;
}
- new->dsa->q = BN_dup(key->dsa->q);
- if (new->dsa->q == NULL) {
+ rc = DSA_set0_pqg(new->dsa, np, nq, ng);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ BN_free(np);
+ BN_free(nq);
+ BN_free(ng);
goto fail;
}
- new->dsa->g = BN_dup(key->dsa->g);
- if (new->dsa->g == NULL) {
+ DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
+ npub_key = BN_dup(pub_key);
+ if (npub_key == NULL) {
goto fail;
}
- new->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(key->dsa->pub_key);
- if (new->dsa->pub_key == NULL) {
+ rc = DSA_set0_key(new->dsa, npub_key, NULL);
+ if (rc == 0) {
goto fail;
}
if (!demote && (key->flags & SSH_KEY_FLAG_PRIVATE)) {
- new->dsa->priv_key = BN_dup(key->dsa->priv_key);
- if (new->dsa->priv_key == NULL) {
+ npriv_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
+ if (npriv_key == NULL) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ rc = DSA_set0_key(new->dsa, NULL, npriv_key);
+ if (rc == 0) {
goto fail;
}
}
break;
+ }
case SSH_KEYTYPE_RSA:
- case SSH_KEYTYPE_RSA1:
+ case SSH_KEYTYPE_RSA1: {
+ const BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *nn, *ne, *nd;
new->rsa = RSA_new();
if (new->rsa == NULL) {
goto fail;
@@ -288,62 +310,82 @@ ssh_key pki_key_dup(const ssh_key key, int demote)
* dmq1 = d mod (q-1)
* iqmp = q^-1 mod p
*/
- new->rsa->n = BN_dup(key->rsa->n);
- if (new->rsa->n == NULL) {
+ RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &n, &e, &d);
+ nn = BN_dup(n);
+ ne = BN_dup(e);
+ if (nn == NULL || ne == NULL) {
+ BN_free(nn);
+ BN_free(ne);
goto fail;
}
- new->rsa->e = BN_dup(key->rsa->e);
- if (new->rsa->e == NULL) {
+ rc = RSA_set0_key(new->rsa, nn, ne, NULL);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ BN_free(nn);
+ BN_free(ne);
goto fail;
}
if (!demote && (key->flags & SSH_KEY_FLAG_PRIVATE)) {
- new->rsa->d = BN_dup(key->rsa->d);
- if (new->rsa->d == NULL) {
+ const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *dmp1 = NULL,
+ *dmq1 = NULL, *iqmp = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *np, *nq, *ndmp1, *ndmq1, *niqmp;
+
+ nd = BN_dup(d);
+ if (nd == NULL) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ rc = RSA_set0_key(new->rsa, NULL, NULL, nd);
+ if (rc == 0) {
goto fail;
}
/* p, q, dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp may be NULL in private keys, but the
* RSA operations are much faster when these values are available.
*/
- if (key->rsa->p != NULL) {
- new->rsa->p = BN_dup(key->rsa->p);
- if (new->rsa->p == NULL) {
+ RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &p, &q);
+ if (p != NULL && q != NULL) { /* need to set both of them */
+ np = BN_dup(p);
+ nq = BN_dup(q);
+ if (np == NULL || nq == NULL) {
+ BN_free(np);
+ BN_free(nq);
goto fail;
}
- }
- if (key->rsa->q != NULL) {
- new->rsa->q = BN_dup(key->rsa->q);
- if (new->rsa->q == NULL) {
+ rc = RSA_set0_factors(new->rsa, np, nq);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ BN_free(np);
+ BN_free(nq);
goto fail;
}
}
- if (key->rsa->dmp1 != NULL) {
- new->rsa->dmp1 = BN_dup(key->rsa->dmp1);
- if (new->rsa->dmp1 == NULL) {
+ RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
+ if (dmp1 != NULL || dmq1 != NULL || iqmp != NULL) {
+ ndmp1 = BN_dup(dmp1);
+ ndmq1 = BN_dup(dmq1);
+ niqmp = BN_dup(iqmp);
+ if (ndmp1 == NULL || ndmq1 == NULL || niqmp == NULL) {
+ BN_free(ndmp1);
+ BN_free(ndmq1);
+ BN_free(niqmp);
goto fail;
}
- }
- if (key->rsa->dmq1 != NULL) {
- new->rsa->dmq1 = BN_dup(key->rsa->dmq1);
- if (new->rsa->dmq1 == NULL) {
- goto fail;
- }
- }
-
- if (key->rsa->iqmp != NULL) {
- new->rsa->iqmp = BN_dup(key->rsa->iqmp);
- if (new->rsa->iqmp == NULL) {
+ rc = RSA_set0_crt_params(new->rsa, ndmp1, ndmq1, niqmp);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ BN_free(ndmp1);
+ BN_free(ndmq1);
+ BN_free(niqmp);
goto fail;
}
}
}
break;
+ }
case SSH_KEYTYPE_ECDSA:
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ECC
new->ecdsa_nid = key->ecdsa_nid;
@@ -466,51 +508,64 @@ int pki_key_compare(const ssh_key k1,
enum ssh_keycmp_e what)
{
switch (k1->type) {
- case SSH_KEYTYPE_DSS:
+ case SSH_KEYTYPE_DSS: {
+ const BIGNUM *p1, *p2, *q1, *q2, *g1, *g2,
+ *pub_key1, *pub_key2, *priv_key1, *priv_key2;
if (DSA_size(k1->dsa) != DSA_size(k2->dsa)) {
return 1;
}
- if (bignum_cmp(k1->dsa->p, k2->dsa->p) != 0) {
+ DSA_get0_pqg(k1->dsa, &p1, &q1, &g1);
+ DSA_get0_pqg(k2->dsa, &p2, &q2, &g2);
+ if (bignum_cmp(p1, p2) != 0) {
return 1;
}
- if (bignum_cmp(k1->dsa->q, k2->dsa->q) != 0) {
+ if (bignum_cmp(q1, q2) != 0) {
return 1;
}
- if (bignum_cmp(k1->dsa->g, k2->dsa->g) != 0) {
+ if (bignum_cmp(g1, g2) != 0) {
return 1;
}
- if (bignum_cmp(k1->dsa->pub_key, k2->dsa->pub_key) != 0) {
+ DSA_get0_key(k1->dsa, &pub_key1, &priv_key1);
+ DSA_get0_key(k2->dsa, &pub_key2, &priv_key2);
+ if (bignum_cmp(pub_key1, pub_key2) != 0) {
return 1;
}
if (what == SSH_KEY_CMP_PRIVATE) {
- if (bignum_cmp(k1->dsa->priv_key, k2->dsa->priv_key) != 0) {
+ if (bignum_cmp(priv_key1, priv_key2) != 0) {
return 1;
}
}
break;
+ }
case SSH_KEYTYPE_RSA:
- case SSH_KEYTYPE_RSA1:
+ case SSH_KEYTYPE_RSA1: {
+ const BIGNUM *e1, *e2, *n1, *n2, *p1, *p2, *q1, *q2;
if (RSA_size(k1->rsa) != RSA_size(k2->rsa)) {
return 1;
}
- if (bignum_cmp(k1->rsa->e, k2->rsa->e) != 0) {
+ RSA_get0_key(k1->rsa, &n1, &e1, NULL);
+ RSA_get0_key(k2->rsa, &n2, &e2, NULL);
+ if (bignum_cmp(e1, e2) != 0) {
return 1;
}
- if (bignum_cmp(k1->rsa->n, k2->rsa->n) != 0) {
+ if (bignum_cmp(n1, n2) != 0) {
return 1;
}
if (what == SSH_KEY_CMP_PRIVATE) {
- if (bignum_cmp(k1->rsa->p, k2->rsa->p) != 0) {
+ RSA_get0_factors(k1->rsa, &p1, &q1);
+ RSA_get0_factors(k2->rsa, &p2, &q2);
+ if (bignum_cmp(p1, p2) != 0) {
return 1;
}
- if (bignum_cmp(k1->rsa->q, k2->rsa->q) != 0) {
+ if (bignum_cmp(q1, q2) != 0) {
return 1;
}
}
break;
+ }
case SSH_KEYTYPE_ECDSA:
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ECC
{
@@ -826,43 +881,65 @@ int pki_pubkey_build_dss(ssh_key key,
ssh_string q,
ssh_string g,
ssh_string pubkey) {
+ int rc;
+ BIGNUM *bp, *bq, *bg, *bpub_key;
+
key->dsa = DSA_new();
if (key->dsa == NULL) {
return SSH_ERROR;
}
- key->dsa->p = ssh_make_string_bn(p);
- key->dsa->q = ssh_make_string_bn(q);
- key->dsa->g = ssh_make_string_bn(g);
- key->dsa->pub_key = ssh_make_string_bn(pubkey);
- if (key->dsa->p == NULL ||
- key->dsa->q == NULL ||
- key->dsa->g == NULL ||
- key->dsa->pub_key == NULL) {
- DSA_free(key->dsa);
- return SSH_ERROR;
+ bp = ssh_make_string_bn(p);
+ bq = ssh_make_string_bn(q);
+ bg = ssh_make_string_bn(g);
+ bpub_key = ssh_make_string_bn(pubkey);
+ if (bp == NULL || bq == NULL ||
+ bg == NULL || bpub_key == NULL) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ rc = DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, bp, bq, bg);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ rc = DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, bpub_key, NULL);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ goto fail;
}
return SSH_OK;
+fail:
+ DSA_free(key->dsa);
+ return SSH_ERROR;
}
int pki_pubkey_build_rsa(ssh_key key,
ssh_string e,
ssh_string n) {
+ int rc;
+ BIGNUM *be, *bn;
+
key->rsa = RSA_new();
if (key->rsa == NULL) {
return SSH_ERROR;
}
- key->rsa->e = ssh_make_string_bn(e);
- key->rsa->n = ssh_make_string_bn(n);
- if (key->rsa->e == NULL ||
- key->rsa->n == NULL) {
- RSA_free(key->rsa);
- return SSH_ERROR;
+ be = ssh_make_string_bn(e);
+ bn = ssh_make_string_bn(n);
+ if (be == NULL || bn == NULL) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ rc = RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, bn, be, NULL);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ goto fail;
}
return SSH_OK;
+fail:
+ RSA_free(key->rsa);
+ return SSH_ERROR;
}
ssh_string pki_publickey_to_blob(const ssh_key key)
@@ -905,23 +982,26 @@ ssh_string pki_publickey_to_blob(const ssh_key key)
}
switch (key->type) {
- case SSH_KEYTYPE_DSS:
- p = ssh_make_bignum_string(key->dsa->p);
+ case SSH_KEYTYPE_DSS: {
+ const BIGNUM *bp, *bq, *bg, *bpub_key;
+ DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &bp, &bq, &bg);
+ p = ssh_make_bignum_string((BIGNUM *)bp);
if (p == NULL) {
goto fail;
}
- q = ssh_make_bignum_string(key->dsa->q);
+ q = ssh_make_bignum_string((BIGNUM *)bq);
if (q == NULL) {
goto fail;
}
- g = ssh_make_bignum_string(key->dsa->g);
+ g = ssh_make_bignum_string((BIGNUM *)bg);
if (g == NULL) {
goto fail;
}
- n = ssh_make_bignum_string(key->dsa->pub_key);
+ DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &bpub_key, NULL);
+ n = ssh_make_bignum_string((BIGNUM *)bpub_key);
if (n == NULL) {
goto fail;
}
@@ -953,14 +1033,17 @@ ssh_string pki_publickey_to_blob(const ssh_key key)
n = NULL;
break;
+ }
case SSH_KEYTYPE_RSA:
- case SSH_KEYTYPE_RSA1:
- e = ssh_make_bignum_string(key->rsa->e);
+ case SSH_KEYTYPE_RSA1: {
+ const BIGNUM *be, *bn;
+ RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &bn, &be, NULL);
+ e = ssh_make_bignum_string((BIGNUM *)be);
if (e == NULL) {
goto fail;
}
- n = ssh_make_bignum_string(key->rsa->n);
+ n = ssh_make_bignum_string((BIGNUM *)bn);
if (n == NULL) {
goto fail;
}
@@ -980,6 +1063,7 @@ ssh_string pki_publickey_to_blob(const ssh_key key)
n = NULL;
break;
+ }
case SSH_KEYTYPE_ECDSA:
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ECC
rc = ssh_buffer_reinit(buffer);
@@ -1082,13 +1166,15 @@ int pki_export_pubkey_rsa1(const ssh_key key,
char *e;
char *n;
int rsa_size = RSA_size(key->rsa);
+ const BIGNUM *be, *bn;
- e = bignum_bn2dec(key->rsa->e);
+ RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &bn, &be, NULL);
+ e = bignum_bn2dec(be);
if (e == NULL) {
return SSH_ERROR;
}
- n = bignum_bn2dec(key->rsa->n);
+ n = bignum_bn2dec(bn);
if (n == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(e);
return SSH_ERROR;
@@ -1153,6 +1239,7 @@ static ssh_string pki_dsa_signature_to_blob(const ssh_signature sig)
{
char buffer[40] = { 0 };
ssh_string sig_blob = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *pr, *ps;
ssh_string r;
int r_len, r_offset_in, r_offset_out;
@@ -1160,12 +1247,13 @@ static ssh_string pki_dsa_signature_to_blob(const ssh_signature sig)
ssh_string s;
int s_len, s_offset_in, s_offset_out;
- r = ssh_make_bignum_string(sig->dsa_sig->r);
+ DSA_SIG_get0(sig->dsa_sig, &pr, &ps);
+ r = ssh_make_bignum_string((BIGNUM *)pr);
if (r == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
- s = ssh_make_bignum_string(sig->dsa_sig->s);
+ s = ssh_make_bignum_string((BIGNUM *)ps);
if (s == NULL) {
ssh_string_free(r);
return NULL;
@@ -1218,13 +1306,15 @@ ssh_string pki_signature_to_blob(const ssh_signature sig)
ssh_string s;
ssh_buffer b;
int rc;
+ const BIGNUM *pr, *ps;
b = ssh_buffer_new();
if (b == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
- r = ssh_make_bignum_string(sig->ecdsa_sig->r);
+ ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig->ecdsa_sig, &pr, &ps);
+ r = ssh_make_bignum_string((BIGNUM *)pr);
if (r == NULL) {
ssh_buffer_free(b);
return NULL;
@@ -1236,7 +1326,7 @@ ssh_string pki_signature_to_blob(const ssh_signature sig)
return NULL;
}
- s = ssh_make_bignum_string(sig->ecdsa_sig->s);
+ s = ssh_make_bignum_string((BIGNUM *)ps);
if (s == NULL) {
ssh_buffer_free(b);
return NULL;
@@ -1345,6 +1435,7 @@ ssh_signature pki_signature_from_blob(const ssh_key pubkey,
ssh_string s;
size_t len;
int rc;
+ BIGNUM *pr = NULL, *ps = NULL;
sig = ssh_signature_new();
if (sig == NULL) {
@@ -1385,9 +1476,9 @@ ssh_signature pki_signature_from_blob(const ssh_key pubkey,
}
ssh_string_fill(r, ssh_string_data(sig_blob), 20);
- sig->dsa_sig->r = ssh_make_string_bn(r);
+ pr = ssh_make_string_bn(r);
ssh_string_free(r);
- if (sig->dsa_sig->r == NULL) {
+ if (pr == NULL) {
ssh_signature_free(sig);
return NULL;
}
@@ -1399,9 +1490,15 @@ ssh_signature pki_signature_from_blob(const ssh_key pubkey,
}
ssh_string_fill(s, (char *)ssh_string_data(sig_blob) + 20, 20);
- sig->dsa_sig->s = ssh_make_string_bn(s);
+ ps = ssh_make_string_bn(s);
ssh_string_free(s);
- if (sig->dsa_sig->s == NULL) {
+ if (ps == NULL) {
+ ssh_signature_free(sig);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ rc = DSA_SIG_set0(sig->dsa_sig, pr, ps);
+ if (rc == 0) {
ssh_signature_free(sig);
return NULL;
}
@@ -1449,10 +1546,10 @@ ssh_signature pki_signature_from_blob(const ssh_key pubkey,
ssh_print_hexa("r", ssh_string_data(r), ssh_string_len(r));
#endif
- ssh_make_string_bn_inplace(r, sig->ecdsa_sig->r);
+ pr = ssh_make_string_bn(r);
ssh_string_burn(r);
ssh_string_free(r);
- if (sig->ecdsa_sig->r == NULL) {
+ if (pr == NULL) {
ssh_buffer_free(b);
ssh_signature_free(sig);
return NULL;
@@ -1470,10 +1567,16 @@ ssh_signature pki_signature_from_blob(const ssh_key pubkey,
ssh_print_hexa("s", ssh_string_data(s), ssh_string_len(s));
#endif
- ssh_make_string_bn_inplace(s, sig->ecdsa_sig->s);
+ ps = ssh_make_string_bn(s);
ssh_string_burn(s);
ssh_string_free(s);
- if (sig->ecdsa_sig->s == NULL) {
+ if (ps == NULL) {
+ ssh_signature_free(sig);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ rc = ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig->ecdsa_sig, pr, ps);
+ if (rc == 0) {
ssh_signature_free(sig);
return NULL;
}
@@ -1601,8 +1704,12 @@ ssh_signature pki_do_sign(const ssh_key privkey,
}
#ifdef DEBUG_CRYPTO
- ssh_print_bignum("r", sig->dsa_sig->r);
- ssh_print_bignum("s", sig->dsa_sig->s);
+ {
+ const BIGNUM *pr, *ps;
+ DSA_SIG_get0(sig->dsa_sig, &pr, &ps);
+ ssh_print_bignum("r", (BIGNUM *) pr);
+ ssh_print_bignum("s", (BIGNUM *) ps);
+ }
#endif
break;
@@ -1624,8 +1731,12 @@ ssh_signature pki_do_sign(const ssh_key privkey,
}
# ifdef DEBUG_CRYPTO
- ssh_print_bignum("r", sig->ecdsa_sig->r);
- ssh_print_bignum("s", sig->ecdsa_sig->s);
+ {
+ const BIGNUM *pr, *ps;
+ ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig->ecdsa_sig, &pr, &ps);
+ ssh_print_bignum("r", (BIGNUM *) pr);
+ ssh_print_bignum("s", (BIGNUM *) ps);
+ }
# endif /* DEBUG_CRYPTO */
break;
--
2.10.1
| Re: Build libssh against openssl 1.1.0 | Andreas Schneider <asn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
| Re: Build libssh against openssl 1.1.0 | Jakub Jelen <jjelen@xxxxxxxxxx> |
| Build libssh against openssl 1.1.0 | Jakub Jelen <jjelen@xxxxxxxxxx> |
| Re: Build libssh against openssl 1.1.0 | Andreas Schneider <asn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
| Re: Build libssh against openssl 1.1.0 | Jakub Jelen <jjelen@xxxxxxxxxx> |